The rationale for returning to CRR rests primarily on the argument that l,RR weakens the contemporaneous link between reserves and deposits of depository institutions. For example, it was argued that depository institutions would have no incentive to curtail their lending activities under LRR because they are not required to hold reserves against the deposits that these activities create until the following week. Consequently, an increase in loan demand would be more readily transmitted into a change in the money stock in the short run under LRR.
At a more formal level, the case for CR11 was usually presented in terms of the supply of and demand for
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argued that the money supply schedule is flatter under LRR than under CR11. This is illustrated in figures 1 and 2. Consequently, random variation in the demand for money represented by the shaded area in figure Il results in more var-iability in the stock of money and less variability in the interest rate under' LRR, as illustrated in figure 1.Also, random variation in the supply of money represented by the shaded areas in figure 2 ) results in more variabilit in money and interest rates under 1,811. Thus, compared with CRR. LRR produces greater variation in the money stock. Whether interest rates are also more variable depends on the relative magnitude of the variance of the supply-side and demand-side disturbances.'
An Alternative Analysis of What to Expect under CRR
There are two reasons why the result predicted above need not occur. First, depository institutions' behavior may not be as sensitive to the reserve accounting system in effect as this analysis suggests. Consequently, the switch from LRR to CRR may not significantly alter the week-to-week variability of 'There are other factors, not considered here, that also affect the outcome; see Thornton (1983b) and the references cited there. money and interest rates, at least in the short run. Second, the suggested outcome is predicated on the assumption that the Federal Reserve is targeting on a reserve aggregate. If the Federal Reserve is not targeting explicitly on money or a reserve aggregate in the short run, the variability of money and interest rates will not necessarily be related to the reserve accounting system.
The first view argues that the short-mn contemporaneous link between depository institutions' decisions to make additional loans and investments and their holdings of reserves need not be close even under a system of CRR.' In the short run, depository institutions can obtain additional reserves by borrowing from the Federal Reserve or holding temporarily fewer excess reserves than they would hold otherwise. These factors may be sufficient to accommodate most short-run, week-to-week supply-and demand-side disturbances. Consequently, the slopes of the money supply schedules under LRR or CRR may be similar. Unless the adoption of CRR fundamentally changes the way that depository institutions adjust their reserve positions, there may be no dramatic change in the volatility of money and interest rates in the short run.
'See Thornton (1983b) for a more detailed explanation of the arguments presented in this section. 
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This conjecture is likely to be even more valid given that the new CR8 system lengthened the reserve settlement period from one to two weeks.' Depository institutions may now make loans early in the accounting period, waiting to settle (through the discount window, the money market or changes in excess reserves) toward the end of the period. By accommodating loan demand at the first part of the period and settling later in the period, week-to-week variability in money and interest rates could be similar under' the new system of CR11 and the old system of LRR.'
The Role of Federal Resen'e Operating Procedures
Expectations of differential effects in the var'iability of money and interest rates under CR11 and LRR are based on the assumption that the Federal Reserve is attempting to hit a monetary target by manipulating a reserve aggregate. If this is not the case, there is little reason to expect differential effects associated with a change in the reserve accounting system. For example, week-to-week variability of money and interest rates are unaffected by the choice of reserve accounting system under an interest rate targeting procedure.' This point is important because the Federal Reserve changed operating procedures in the fall of 1982, about a year and a half befom'e the implementation of CRR. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMCI followed a reserve aggregate targeting procedure that placed greater emphasis on movements in Ml as a policy guide from October 6, 1979, to early October 1982.' Since then, the FOMC has placed less emphasis on the behavior of Ml in the short run, ainung instead at longer-run monetary and credit aggregate objectives. This policy has been implemented in the short 'For a discussion of the new system, see Gilbert and Trebing (1982) . For an interesting analysis of the carryover provision of the new system of CRR, see Spindt and Tarhan (1984) . Some have suggested that the Federal Reserve has no choice but to accommodate this credit expansion, since the additional reserves needed to support the new deposits can only come into the system via the discount window. This argument comes perilously close to saying that the Federal Reserve must accommodate credit demand completely under LRR. This position, however, ignores the dynamics of these long-run adjustments. For another view of this process, see Thomton (1982) , p. 29.
'The short-run money supply schedule is completely flat (interest' elastic). Thus, the variability of money would be completely determined by the random variation in the demand for money, and this would be unaffected by the reserve accounting system.
'For a discussion of the issues surrounding the decision to deemphasize Ml as an intermediate target, see Thornton (1983a) .
run through a "flexible nonborrowed-reserves path." As a result of this procedural change, the variability of money and interest rates immediately before and after the implementation of CR11 may reveal little change.
HAS THE VARIABILITY OF MONEY AND INTEREST RATES CHANGED
SINCE CRR?
Before a comparison of the weekly variability of money and interest rates for periods before and after the adoption of CR11 can be made, one must decide what measure of variability to use. The measure used here is the aver-age absolute percentage change (AAPC).' This is prefer'able to two more commonly cited measures, the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation, as a measure of the short-run, week-to-week variability that this article is concerned with (see the insert on page 30).
Data are presented for various subperiods to reflect both the move fl'om LRR to CR11 and the change in Federal Reserve operating procedures. Data for the two weeks immediately before and after the implementation of CRR were excluded to guard against the possibility that they were contanunated by expectations or other problems associated with the implementation of the new procedure.
Results for the money stock, Ml, are presented in table 1. The AAPC of seasonally adjusted Ml appears to have increased significantly in the 28-week period following the implementation of CR11, compared with that of the 28-week period immediately before CR11. The AAPC of seasonally adjusted Ml incm'eased from about 0.13 pet-cent to 0.43 percent, a difference that is significant at the 5 percent level." When the most recent period is compared with a similar period in 1983, the increase is much smaller; nevertheless, it is statistically significant." These comparisons, however, are deceptive because revised seasonally adjusted data is "smoother" than preliminary seasonally adjusted data. Thus, the significant increase in the variability of seasonally ad- 'Wallich (1984) , p. 26. Also, see Solomon (1984) . T 'The ,4.APC is defined as AAPC(X) = (1 /(T -1))t " 1 (] X,-X,_, /X,_,)l00. It is a measure of relative variability in that AAPC (10<) AAPC(X), where k is an arbitrary constant. "The t-statistic is 5.20.
"The t-statistic is 3.15.
This is investigated by a comparison of the AAPC over the three periods using either not seasonally adjusted or fia'st-published seasonally adjusted data. If the increased variability is primarily the result of the seasonal adjustment revision rather than the change in the reserve accounting system, then the AAPC for the first-published or not seasonally adjusted Ml should be essentially the same over these periods." Likewise, a comparison of not seasonally adjusted data for the 28-week period since the implementation of CR11 and the corresponding period a year earlier should reveal no change in the AAPC. The data are consistent with both of these conditions. Thus, there appears to be no change in the variability of Ml between the pre-and post-CRR periods.
It is indeterminant, however', whether this result stems fa'om depository institutions not changing their behavior following the enactment of CR11 or from a change in the operating procedur'e in the fall of 1982. In order to determine which explanation is more consistent with the facts, the AAPC was calculated for Ml and three interest rates -the federal funds rate, the three-month Treasury bill rate and the commercial paper rate -for the three-year period of reserve aggregate targeting (October 17, 1979, to September 29, 1982) and for' the year' immediately following the change in the Federal Reserve's operating procedure (October 6, 1982 , to September 28, 1983 . These results are presented in table 2. The data indicate a decline in the AAPC for' both revised and first-published Ml after the fall of 1982; however, this decline is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level." Thus, it, appears there was no significant change in the week-to-week variability of Ml following the change in the operating procedures.
The AA.PCs for all three inter'est rates, however, decrease significantly after the fall of 1982. Thus, it appears that the change in operating procedure had some impact on the behavior of interest rates. Hence, "For example, see Hem and Ott (1983) . "A comparison of these data is perhaps more relevant because these are the figures that economic agents and policymakers use to make their decisions.
"The relevant t-statistics for first-published and not seasonally adjusted data are 0.91 and 0.15, respectively. 
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this article was to take an ear-I look at the effect of the Federal Reserve's new system of contemporaneous r'eserve accounting on the variability of money and interest rates. Although the CR11 system was adopted with the expectation that it would reduce the variability of money under a reserve targeting procedure, it may not have that effect for two reasons. First, depository institutions may behave in ways that reduce the short-run contemporaneous link between aggregate reserves arid deposits even under' CR11. Second, the change in operating procedures in October-1982 may have preempted any potential benefits from the switch in accounting systems.
'The data for Ml indicate that there was no significant change in week-to-week variability following either the change in operating pr'ocedure in October 1982 or the adoption of CR11. The variability of shortrun interest rates declined significantly after' the change in operating procedures, but has been unaffected by the implementation of CR11. 'I'hus, the change in the reserve accounting procedui-e had no statistically significant impact on the variability of money either because depository institutions' lending and investment decisions are insensitive to the r'eserve accounting system. or because of the change in operating procedures that occur-red some year and a half earlier. Consequently, CRR's potential usefulness in reducing the variability of money can be deter-mined for certain only if the Federal Reserve implements a strict reserve aggregate or monetary base target.
